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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

PAUL EDWIN WOOLLEY,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 900012-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in denying
Appellants challenge of a juror for cause?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for two
counts of Forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-501 (1953 as amended).

A jury found Mr. Woolley guilty

of both counts after a trial held on October 31 and November 1, 1989
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 28, 1989, at about 1:30 p.m., Steven Blaylock
placed his checkbook in the center console of his Ford Bronco truck
(TI 78).

(Volume I of the transcript is cited herein as TI,

Volume II is cited as T2.)

At about 4:30 p.m. on that same day, he

noticed that the checkbook was gone and called his bank to stop
payment on the missing checks (TI 80). The missing checks were
numbered 710 through 725 (TI 78).
At about 6:00 p.m. on August 28, 1989, Peggy Kobashigawa, a
clerk at the courtesy booth of the Smith's Food King located at 828
South 9 00 West in Salt Lake City, cashed a check in the amount of
fifty dollars for Appellant (TI 57). The check was made out to
Appellant and Appellant showed Ms. Kobashigawa his Smith's check
cashing card and his Utah identification card in order to cash the
check (TI 59-60).

The check was drawn on the account of Steven

Blaylock and numbered 713 (TI 57, 58).
Ms. Kobashigawa testified that two or three hours before
Mr. Woolley cashed the fifty dollar check, he had approached her and
attempted to cash a check made out to him for one hundred dollars.
She told Mr. Woolley that she could not cash a two-party check for
more than fifty dollars (TI 57).
About an hour or two after Ms. Kobashigawa cashed the fifty
dollar check, Mr. Woolley returned to the store and attempted to
cash another fifty dollar check.

Ms. Kobashigawa refused to cash

the check, t€illing Appellant that she would cash only one fifty
dollar check for an individual in a twenty-four-hour period (TI 63).
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On the morning of August 29, 1989, Mr. Woolley asked Carol
Goode, a checker in the same Smith's Food King, to cash the second
fifty dollar check for him (TI 95). Mr. Woolley again presented his
Smith's card and Utah identification card (TI 95-6).

Because the

ZIP code on the check was outside the store's area, Ms. Goode called
for a manager to approve the check (TI 96).
Officers called to the store arrested Mr. Woolley shortly
thereafter.

According to one of the arresting officers, Mr. Woolley

stated that he had received the checks from Steven Blaylock in
exchange for work he had done for Mr. Blaylock (TI 107).
Mr. Woolley also told officers that he had cashed a check at the
store the night before (TI 108).
The arresting officers contacted Mr. Blaylock, who
immediately went to the Smith's store (TI 108). Mr. Blaylock
indicated that he had not written the checks to Mr. Woolley;
Mr. Woolley told the officers that the person representing himself
to be Steven Blaylock who had written the checks was not the man who
appeared at Smith's (TI 111).
Mr. Woolley had regularly frequented the Smith's where the
checks were cashed for at least eighteen months (TI 145-6).

The

checks were made out to him and he used his identification in
cashing them (TI 59, 95). He testified that he had been hired at
the Utah State Employment Office by a man claiming to be Steven
Blaylock to do two days of labor in Heber City.

The man paid him

with the one hundred dollar check, but when Mr. Woolley was unable
to cash the check, the man wrote him two fifty dollar checks instead
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(TI 152-3, 155, 156-7).
The State charged Mr, Woolley with two counts of Forgery,
During voir dire, the trial judge asked the jury panel
whether any of the jurors had "been the victim of a forgery or a
crime involving deception or fraud" (TI 32). Jurors Hoyt,
VanLeeuwen and Tyler answered that they had been victims of such a
crime (TI 33)• Mr. Hoyt stated that his wallet was taken while he
was in California and his credit card had been used (TI 33).
Mr, VanLeeuwen stated that he "was in Brazil at the time that they
stole checks and wrote about five grand on [his] account" (TI 33).
Mr, Tyler stated that some checks were stolen from him in 1961 when
he lived in Los Angeles and someone had forged his signature on some
of those checks (TI 33). (See Addendum B for transcript of entire
voir dire covering this issue.)
Rather than asking the three jurors what their reactions
were to the forgeries, the trial judge asked whether the prior
experience would preclude them from deciding the instant case based
only on the evidence before them (TI 33). None of the three
indicated that the prior experience would interfere (TI 33).
At the conclusion of voir dire, during a bench conference,
defense counsel challenged all three jurors (TI 35, 74-5).

The

trial judge initially struck all three jurors for cause, then
reinstated Juror VanLeeuwen (R 46; TI 74-5).

The court's rationale

for reinstating Mr. VanLeeuwen was that because "Mr. VanLeeuwen's
experience did occur in a foreign country, that the objection to
striking at least Mr. VanLeeuwen from that group for cause was well
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taken . . . " (TI 76) .
The jury convicted Mr. Woolley of both counts (R 74, 75).
The trial court sentenced Mr. Woolley to serve zero to five years at
the Utah State Prison on each count, such sentences to be served
concurrently.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to excuse
for cause a juror who had been a victim of a crime identical to the
crime with which Appellant was charged.

The similarity of the

crimes raised an inference of bias which required that the trial
judge excuse the juror or probe further.

The fact that the trial

judge excused two other jurors who gave similar answers to that of
the challenged juror, and initially excused the challenged juror,
then changed his mind, demonstrates the error in retaining the
juror.

Because Appellant was required to use a peremptory challenge

against the juror who should have been excused for cause, Appellant
is entitled to a new trial.

ARGUMENT
POINT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
EXCUSE FOR CAUSE A JUROR WHO HAD BEEN THE VICTIM OF
AN IDENTICAL CRIME.
Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in
pertinent part:
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(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to
a particular juror and may be taken on one or more
of the following grounds:

(14) that a state of mind exists on the
part of the juror with reference to the cause,
or to either party, which will prevent him from
acting impartially and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of the party challenging;
but no person shall be disqualified as a juror
by reason of having formed or expressed an
opinion upon the matter or cause to be
submitted to such jury, founded upon public
rumor, statements in public journals or common
notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the
court that the juror can and will,
notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially
and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to
him.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantee an accused
in a criminal proceeding the right to a trial by an impartial
jury.1

In an effort to comply with this constitutional provision,

the legislature enacted Utah Code Ann, § 77-35-18 (1982).2

State v.

Brooks. 563 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1977) ("Brooks I").

1

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the
importance of an impartial jury in a criminal proceeding and has
reversed criminal convictions based solely on the appearance that
such right may have been jeopardized. See State v. Pike, 712 P.2d
277, 279-81 (Utah 1988) (discussing rationale for presumption of
prejudice where improper contact between jurors and witnesses or
court personnel occurs); see also State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah
1989) (appellant entitled to new trial where prosecutor struck
Hispanic juror to get even with defense counsel who had insisted
that Hispanics be included on panel).
2

The Utah Supreme Court adopted the rule as Rule 18, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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It is well established that a party is entitled to use his
or her peremptory challenges on impartial jurors.

Brooks I, 563

P.2d at 802-3; Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975);
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 883 (Utah 1981) ("Brooks II").
Prejudicial error occurs where a party is required to use a
peremptory challenge to exclude a juror who should have been excused
for cause.

Crawford at 1093; State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768

(Utah 1980); Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 537 (Utah 1981);
State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987).

The rationale for

finding reversible error in any case where a defendant is forced to
use a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror who should have been
excused for cause is:
Peremptory challenges form an effective method of
assuring the fairness of a jury trial. Hence,
forcing a party to use his peremptory challenges to
strike jurors who should have been stricken for
cause denies the litigant a substantial right.
Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 537, quoting Waskel v. Frankel, 569 P.2d 230,
232 (Ariz. 1977).

In State v. Bailey, the Utah Supreme Court

pointed out that:
[F]ailure to excuse the challenged juror for cause
was prejudicial and in effect it deprived defendant
of one of his statutory peremptory challenges . . . .
Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768, quoting State v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629, 631
(Utah 1977).
The Utah Supreme Court has defined juror impartiality as a
"mental attitude of appropriate indifference."
at 802. As the Utah Supreme Court noted:
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Brooks I, 563 P.2d

Chief Justice Marshall, presiding over the trial of
Aaron Burr in 1807, defined an impartial jury as one
composed of persons who "will fairly hear the
testimony which may be offered to them, and bring in
their verdict, according to that testimony, and
according to the law arising on it,"
State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d at 767, quoting Burr's Trial, p. 415. The
Bailey court further quoted Marshall's test for impartiality which
the United States Supreme Court embraced in Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878):
[L]ight impressions which may fairly be supposed to
yield to the testimony that may be offered; which may
leave the mind open to a fair consideration of that
testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to a
juror; but that those strong and deep impressions
which will close the mind against the testimony that
may be offered in opposition to them; which will
combat that testimony and resist its force, do
constitute a sufficient objection to him (citation
omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that
When comments are made which facially question a
prospective juror's impartiality or prejudice, an
abuse of discretion may occur unless the challenged
juror is removed by the court or unless the court or
counsel investigates and finds the inference rebutted.
State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989); State v. Bishop, 735
P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988).
In State v. Bailey, the Court pointed out that despite
comments from a juror which "facially raised a question of bias, the
Court failed to further probe [the] matter."

605 P.2d at 768. The

Court noted that the trial court had removed another juror for cause
who had made statements which were similar to those of the
challenged juror.

The Court held that under such circumstances,

"the District Court had a duty to remove [the jurors] for bias, or
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investigate further until the inference of bias was
rebutted . . . ."

Id.

Hence, when a juror7s comments "facially raise[] a question
of bias," the court abuses its discretion if it fails to probe
further into the matter.

Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768.

Where an inference of bias is raised, it cannot be rebutted
simply by the juror's statement that he or she can be fair.

As the

Court stated in State v. Jones, 734 P.2d at 475, citing Brooks II,
631 P.2d at 884:

"When a prospective juror expresses an attitude of

bias, a later assertion by the juror that he or she can render an
impartial verdict cannot attenuate the earlier expressions of
bias."

Furthermore, "[a] statement made by a prospective juror that

he intends to be fair and impartial loses its meaning in light of
other testimony or facts that suggest bias."
P.2d 22, 26 (Utah 1984).

State v. Hewitt, 689

See also State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280

(Utah 1985) (juror may not be able to recognize influence of
improper contacts); People v. Diaz, 200 Cal. Reptr. 77, 80 (Cal.
App. 4 Dist. 1984) (recognition that statement regarding ability to
deliberate impartially is self-serving).
In determining whether a trial judge erred in failing to
excuse a juror for cause, "some deference must be accorded the
discretion of the trial court." Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536 (citations
omitted).

The Jenkins Court pointed out, however, that

[nevertheless, we also view the exercise of
discretion in light of the fact that it is a simple
matter to obviate any problem of bias simply by
excusing the prospective juror and selecting another.
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Id.
In order to properly exercise its discretion, the "trial
court must determine by a process of logic and reason, based upon
common experience, whether the juror can stand in attitude of
indifference between the state and the accused.
omitted]"

[citation

State v. Moton. 749 P.2d 639, 643 (Utah 1988).

In Brooks II, the Utah Supreme Court held that reversible
error occurred where the trial judge failed to excuse for cause two
jurors who had been victims of a crime similar to that with which
the defendant was charged.

Both jurors indicated that they had

strong feelings about their experiences but felt that they could
render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence.

631 P.2d

at 882-3.
In Bailey, the trial court failed to excuse two jurors who
indicated that they believed police officers are generally reliable
observers or that the juror would rely on officers "a hundred
percent."

Th€> Supreme Court held that an inference of bias was

raised in both cases and that the trial court committed prejudicial
error in failing to remove the jurors where the inference was not
rebutted.

See also Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d at 535-6 (juror who

would give greater credit to testimony of doctor should have been
excused for cause even though juror indicated she would accept other
evidence even if it was not in accord with that of doctor);
Brooks I, 563 P.2d at 801 (prejudicial error not to excuse jurors
for cause where jurors were friends with witnesses even though
jurors indicated that they would not let friendship interfere).
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In the present case, the trial judge asked whether any
jurors had "been the victim of a forgery or a crime involving
deception or fraud" (TI 32). Three jurors raised their hands. The
trial judge then stated, "Mr. Hoyt, you yourself have been the
victim of such a circumstance?" (TI 32). Juror Hoyt responded,
"Yes, sir.

My wallet was taken when I was in California and my

credit card was used" (TI 33).
The trial court asked Juror Hoyt no further questions and
simply responded, "Very well, and Mr. VanLeeuwen?"

Juror

VanLeeuwen, the juror at issue in this case, stated, "I was in
Brazil at the time that they stole checks and wrote about five grand
on my account" (TI 33). Again, the trial judge directed no more
individual questions to Juror VanLeeuwen, instead moving on to Juror
Tyler, who stated that he "was robbed of some checks and a guy
forged some checks on my[sic] when I lived in L.A. in , 61" (TI 33).
The court directed one additional inquiry to all three
jurors:
Those three of you who have responded,
recognizing that this is a different time and place
and circumstance, would that experience, having been
the victim of that type of a crime, affect your
ability to be fair and impartial in this case, that
is, would you be unable to set aside that experience
and hear the evidence in this case and rule on the
evidence based upon what you hear and the credibility
of the witnesses? If you would not be able to do so,
I want you to raise your hand.
(TI 33). None of the jurors raised his hand (TI 33).
At the conclusion of voir dire, the trial judge asked
defense counsel whether he passed the jury for cause; defense
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counsel responded that he did not (TI 35). The parties approached
the bench, and defense counsel challenged Jurors Hoyt, VanLeeuwen
and Tyler (TI 35, 74-5).
The trial judge initially struck all three jurors for cause,
then reinstated Juror VanLeeuwen (R 46; TI 74-5).

The court's

stated rationale for leaving Mr. VanLeeuwen on the panel was that
Mr. VanLeeuwen7s experience had occurred in a foreign country and
therefore would not affect his impartiality (TI 75).
Mr. VanLeeuwen's statement that he had been a victim of a
crime identical to the crime charged in the instant case and further
information that a significant amount of money had been involved in
his case, raised an inference of bias.

Like the jurors in

Brooks II, Juror VanLeeuwen was a victim of a similar crime.

See

generally People v. Diaz, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 79-85 (discussing strong
potential for bias where juror had previously been the victim of a
crime similar to the crime with which defendant was charged).
Although the trial judge did not give Juror VanLeeuwen the
opportunity to state his reaction to the crime or the depth of his
feelings, the similarity of the crime along with the sum of money
involved facially raised a question as to the juror's bias.

The

trial judge had an obligation to either excuse the juror for cause
or investigate further.

See Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768. The inference

is not rebutted by Juror VanLeeuwen's failure to raise his hand in
response to the judge's longwinded and somewhat confusing question
to the group as a whole as to whether they could be impartial.

See

Jones, 734 P.2d at 475. The trial court's question failed to probe
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further into the potential bias of the three jurors, and a
self-serving response does not overcome the question of bias raised
by the similarities.

See Diaz, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 80.

The trial court excused for cause the two other jurors who
indicated that they had been victims of similar crimes. Neither of
those jurors raised his hand in response to the trial judge's
rehabilitative question.

In other words, neither juror indicated

that his experience as a victim would interfere with his ability to
be impartial.

The trial judge had no additional information about

the other two jurors or their reactions to the crimes which would
indicate bias; the judge was simply aware that the jurors had been
the victims of a similar crime.

Nevertheless, the trial judge

excused both for cause (R 46).
In State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987) n.l, the
Court pointed out:
We note that the trial court excused two other
prospective jurors for cause because of their
statements that they would expect the defendant to
prove his innocence. Neither of these other jurors
indicated that he had any direct ties to the murder
victim or the victim's family, only that the juror
held a generalized belief that a defendant should
have to prove his innocence. This makes the trial
court's failure to dismiss Ms. Opheikens for cause
even more anomalous in light of her similar statement
and her direct ties to the victim's family.
See also State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768 (court failed to remove
juror for cause who had agreed with comments of another juror who
court did remove for cause; under such circumstances, the trial
court "had a duty to remove [the juror] for bias, or investigate
further until the inference of bias was rebutted . . . ,f) .
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The trial judge attempted to distinguish any possible bias
on the part of Juror VanLeeuwen from the bias of the other two
jurors on the* basis that Mr. VanLeeuwen was the victim of a crime in
a foreign country (TI 76) . Such "distinction" was meaningless for
two reasons.

First, it is not clear from Mr. VanLeeuwen7s statement

that the crime occurred in a foreign country; the juror stated that
he was in Brazil when his checks were stolen.

A reasonable

interpretation of the juror7s statement is that he was in Brazil but
the stolen checks and checking account were in Utah.3

At the very

least, if the trial court intended to rely on the foreign aspect of
the crime, it was obligated to inquire further and clarify the
ambiguities in the juror's statement.
In addition, there is no logical basis for assuming that a
victim of an identical crime in a foreign country will be less
biased.

In actuality, based on the meager information gathered by

the trial court, Juror VanLeeuwen was the most likely of the three
jurors to be biased.

Juror Hoyt was the victim of theft and use of

his credit card, not checks.

The inconvenience to Mr. Hoyt and the

difficulty in controlling unauthorized use may well have been easier
in Mr. Hoyt's case than in that of Mr. VanLeeuwen.4

Although

3

If a checkbook were stolen in Brazil, it seems unlikely
that anyone in Brazil would cash checks on a Utah bank. It also
seems unlikely that the juror would have an account in Brazil. The
most reasonable interpretation of Juror VanLeeuwen's statement was
that while he was on a trip to Brazil, someone stole his checks in
Utah and wrote five thousand dollars worth of checks on the account.
4

If Mr. VanLeeuwen were in fact vacationing in Brazil and
returned to an overdrawn checking account where numerous checks had
[continued]
- 14 -

Juror Tyler was a victim of an identical crime, that experience
occurred in 1961, almost thirty years ago.

The remoteness of the

incident suggests less possibility of bias.

Although an inference

of bias was raised in all three cases, of the three jurors, Juror
VanLeeuwen logically should have been the trial judge's first choice
as a person to excuse for cause.
It is important to note that the trial judge initially
excused all three jurors for cause (R 46). 5 After crossing out
Juror VanLeeuwen on the jury list as the second juror excused for
cause, the trial judge reinstated him (R 46).

Defense counsel was

forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove the juror (R 46).
The jury panel consisted of eighteen people in this case
(R 46).

Pursuant to Rule 18(c)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure, each party in this case had four peremptory challenges;
the statute requires eight jurors for a noncapital felony trial.
Had the judge removed all three of the jurors challenged for cause,
the State would have had to agree to waive a peremptory challenge or
the court would have had to expend additional efforts to locate and
voir dire at least one additional juror.

Such inconvenience is not

a valid ground for denying a challenge for cause.

4

[continued]
to be sorted out, Mr. VanLeeuwen probably experienced more of a
headache as the result of being a victim of a similar crime than did
Mr. Hoyt, who had a single credit card to deal with.
5

The juror list indicates that Juror Tyler was the #1
juror excused for cause, Juror VanLeeuwen was the #2 juror excused
for cause, and the Juror Hoyt was the #3 juror excused for cause.
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In this case, the trial judge conducted a very limited
voir dire of the panel.

He refused to ask a number of questions

propounded by defense counsel (R 99-103; TI 29, 30) and, when faced
with answers from three jurors which raised a question of bias,
failed to probe further, instead trying to quickly rehabilitate the
jurors.

Nevertheless, he removed two of the jurors but left a third

who was distinguishable only by the fact that he was the most likely
of the three to be biased.
The trial judge committed reversible error in failing to
remove Juror VanLeeuwen for cause.

As a result, Mr. Woolley is

entitled to a new trial.

CONCLUSION
Appellant, PAUL EDWIN WOOLLEY, by and through counsel,
CHARLES F. LOYD, JR. and JOAN C

WATT, respectfully requests that

this Court reverse his conviction and remand his case for a new
trial.
SUBMITTED this JliJL

day of May, 1990.

CHARLES

FyJ&7&,/J

Attorney /for Dejren&rfnt/Appellant

C^JJkLiLuSty
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this ll-bL

day of May, 1990.

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED by
this

day of May, 1990.
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ADDENDUM A

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Rule 18(e)(4), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection
to a particular juror and may be taken on one or
more of the following grounds:
(14) that a state of mind exists on
the part of the juror with reference to the
cause, or to either party, which will prevent
him from acting impartially and without
prejudice to the substantial rights of the
party challenging; but no person shall be
disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury,
founded upon public rumor, statements in
public journals or common notoriety, if it
satisfactorily appears to the court that the
juror can and will, notwithstanding such
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the
matter to be submitted to him.
Amendment VI to the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own

behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife
shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.

ADDENDUM B

officer?
THE COURT:

I will instruct you, members of the

jury panel, at a later point in this trial that you are to
give no more or less credibility to the testimony of a law
enforcement official than you would to any other witness*
The fact that they are employed as a law enforcement officer
does not give more or less credibility to their testimony.
Now, having stated that, are there any among you who are so
persuaded that law enforcement officers are more credible or
less credible than other witnesses that you couldn't be fair
and impartial in judging their testimony?

If so, raise your

hand.
No hands are raised.
MR. LOYD:

Thank you, your Honor.

inquire if any of them —

Could you

I believe you asked them if any of

the jurors had been accused of a forgery type crime. Could
you ask if any of their close friends or relatives have ever
been the victim of forgery, theft, or any crime involving
fraud or pecuniary loss?
THE COURT:

Are there those among you first,

members of the panel, who have yourselves been the victim of
a forgery or a crime involving deception or fraud?

If so, I

want you to raise your hand.
Mr. Hoyt, you yourself have been the victim of
such a circumstance?

32

1

MR. HOYT:

2

Yes, sir. My wallet was taken when I

was in California and my credit card was used.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. VANLEEUWEN:

5

THE COURT:

7

Very well.

No other hands are raised,

Counsel.

8

Those of you, Messrs. Hoyt and VanLeeuwen, who

9

have responded to that question —

10

oh, excuse me.

Mr. Tyler?

11

MR. TYLER:

12

Yes, I was robbed of some checks and a

guy forged some checks on my when I lived in L.A. in '61.

13

THE COURT:

14

Very well.

Thank you, Mr. Tyler. No

other hands are raised.

15 J

17

I was in Brazil at the time that

they stole checks and wrote about five grand on my account.

6

16

Very well, and Mr. VanLeeuwen?

Those three of you who have responded, recognizing
that this is a different time and place and circumstance,

I would that experience, having been the victim of that type

18 I of a crime, affect your ability to be fair and impartial in
*9

this case, that is, would you be unable to set aside that

20

I experience and hear the evidence in this case and rule on

21

I the evidence based upon what you hear and the credibility of

22

the witnesses?

23

you to raise your hand.

If you would not be able to do so, I want

24

No hands are raised, Mr. Loyd.

25

MR. LOYD:

Thank you, your Honor.
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THE COURT:
MS. WEST:

Excuse me, Ms. West?
Getting back to the second half of that

question that I believe you were going to answer, I have a
family member who has been convicted of a felony for
forgery.
THE COURT:

Very well.

Is this a close family

member, ma'am?
MS. WEST:
THE COURT:

Sister.
All right.

Thank you, Ms. West.

Insofar as this Court is concerned, Ms. West,
would that experience affect your ability in this case to be
fair and impartial?
MS. WEST: No.
THE COURT:

Do you believe you could set aside

that circumstance?
MS. WEST: Yes.
THE COURT:
MR. LOYD:

Very well.

Thank you.

Your Honor, my last question, I think

you asked this in general, but whether or not any of the
jurors have such pressing personal business that they would
not be able to focus their attention on this case during the
trial and deliberations.
THE COURT:

I did ask that question, Counsel.

Recognizing, of course, that the jurors are taken out of
their daily lives to be here, and by observation is that

34

they've all responded they would perform their duties in
this case unfettered by those concerns.
You pass the jury for cause, Mr. Loyd?
MR. LOYD:

No, I don't, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Counsel approach the bench.

(Whereupon, discussion was held at the bench out
of the hearing of the Reporter.)
THE COURT:

All right, Counsel, based upon our

discussions at the bench, you may now take your peremptory
challenges.
Members of the jury panel, we're now at the point
in this trial when the parties and their counsel have the
opportunity to determine which of you will be serving on the
jury in this case.

You have observed up to this point in

time that I've asked you certain questions that bear upon
your qualifications to serve as jurors and have made determinations as to which of you is qualified.

Through the

process now called peremptory challenge, each party has the
opportunity to directly determine which of you will be
serving as jurors.

Since this is a criminal case, each

party will have four peremptory challenges and may exercise
those challenges for any reason whatsoever, whether that be
great or slight.

It is important for you to understand,

however, that in the event you are not chosen as a juror
here/ you should not take the matter personally for the
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